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Genetic Testing: A Cautionary Tale of Foster and Pre-Adoptive Children
What values will guide policy and practice for children in the new genetic eraof the twenty-first century? How does the situation of foster and adoptive
children illuminate the intersection of health policy and social policy? The research
presented here takes foster and adoptive children as a test case for potential conflict
between healthcare benefits and social uses of genetic information, arguing that
genetic testing of children in general and of adoptive and foster children in particu-
lar should be approached with great caution. The potential social disadvantages to
children from the unrestricted and unreflective use of genetic testing must be
weighed against putative medical advances. The primary objective of this analysis is
to provide foresight on these issues, before certain social uses of genetic information
become entrenched. Hindsight arrives too late to reverse the impact of trends that
may profoundly affect the lives and development of the children who are the future
citizens of our society. A second related objective is to give a balanced presentation
of challenges and alternatives to the thesis put forth. A third objective is to present
an ethical analysis of cross-disciplinary and cross-professional problems and insight.
For example, who ought to weigh the medical and social harms and benefits to
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make an informed consent on behalf of the child when the child has no permanent
legal parents? Each profession — law, medicine, social services, and family and
healthcare policy — needs to be informed about the other, especially when consider-
ing the impact of the new genetics on the status of children.
One might ask, why is this issue important now, if genetic testing is not common
practice nor widespread? The answer is that we as a society need to articulate the
value structure that should guide testing of children, before incidents of genetic
testing increase. Foresight, not hindsight, should guide practice and policy, espe-
cially with vulnerable groups of children. It is important to create ethical and policy
guidelines based on values that feature children’s interests. Within the domain of
children’s best interests we find that privacy, equal opportunities for all children,
informed consent for medical testing, and diagnostics and treatment are all in the
child’s best interest. Of course, one purpose of this analysis is to educate the public
about the social impact of testing on children as well as about ethical issues in the
information gathered and made available to the prospective adopters.
Distingushing Medical and Social
Uses of Genetic Information
The distinction between the medical and the social applications of genetic testing
information is heightened for foster and adoptive children in an instructive way.
From a medical viewpoint, very few conditions detectable by genetic testing can be
prevented, aided, or cured. Many of these conditions are included in mandatory
newborn screening policies, now required in most of the fifty states. The most dra-
matic are metabolic disorders for which special diets can be applied at birth to pre-
vent developmental delays and other serious medical conditions. Other conditions
include rare childhood genetic diseases such as Canavan’s Disease, for which an
enzymatic medication is available.
From a social viewpoint, the potential range of genetic testing is broader. First,
those in charge of children’s education and health are invested in predicting future
tendencies. Knowledge of genetic tendencies or susceptibilities may be thought to
facilitate the management of childrearing and planning. For adoptive children, the
desire to compensate for missing medical and family histories is an added incentive
to perform genetic testing. Family medical histories may have medical implications,
as in monitoring for susceptibility to heart disease. Or they may have social applica-
tions, as in cautioning a child with a family history of heart disease in athletic activ-
ity. In addition, for children being placed for adoption, prospective parental demand
for information may put pressure on adoption and social service agencies to obtain
and reveal maximal information about children in the pre-adoptive stage. Because of
these factors, social service observers predict increased social pressures to administer
genetic tests to this group of children.
On the other hand, there are social risks to genetic testing of children. The ge-
netic information may be used in a way to stigmatize the child or to reduce equal
life opportunities in education and employment and even in healthcare insurance,
since insurers share large data bases of medical information on clients. These risks
are magnified for foster and adoptive children who lack permanent, legal parents,
the traditional gatekeepers and protectors of children’s rights, interests, and opportu-
nities.
57
Genetic Testing: A Cautionary Tale of Foster and Pre-Adoptive Children
Genetic information has the power to help or to hinder opportunities for children.
Children with permanent legal parents who also have access to quality healthcare
programs may be protected from the social ill effects of stigma and discrimination
that may come through misuse of genetic testing information. Children in perma-
nent, economically stable families may benefit from genetic testing, diagnostics, and
medical procedures. Children who lack permanent parents and family support and
who lack stable healthcare plans of high quality may be severely disadvantaged in
attaining equal opportunities if genetic testing information is entered on their medi-
cal and social charts. Due to obstacles in the pathways of opportunity described in
this paper, adding genetic information to the picture may exacerbate existing in-
equalities.
Since children are vulnerable to healthcare policy at the outset of the life course,
their position with regard to genetic diagnostics and medicine is especially signifi-
cant. What happens to children who lack permanent legal parents may signal future
risk patterns for children generally, and even for adults. These for children illumi-
nate in general the trade-offs between putative healthcare benefits and risks of social
harm in discrimination and loss of equal opportunity.
Social Justice and Structural
Inequalities in Children’s Status
Questions of social justice, equality of opportunity, and freedom arise for all
children and for foster and adoptive children in particular.1 The facts show that pov-
erty,2 inadequate access to healthcare,3 lack of equal housing,4 and substandard edu-
cational benefits are suffered disproportionately by children in the U.S. The ques-
tions explored here illuminate these structural social factors regarding the socially
vulnerable group of foster and adoptive children. Studies also show that children of
color are disproportionately represented in foster care, in poverty, and in lack of
access to healthcare and educational opportunity.5 As welfare reform exacerbates
these problems, and as foster care statistics continue to rise around the country, the
problem of equal opportunity for children without permanent legal parents will
expand, highlighting this vulnerable sector within an already structurally disadvan-
taged group of children.
Will a new genetic era bring eugenic assumptions, covertly or overtly, into social
policy? Historians of eugenics and genetic policy experts observe the prevalence of
eugenic assumptions in social policy in the first half of the twentieth century. They
worry that contemporary genetic social practices will raise eugenics in another
form.6 Eugenics has special relevance to adoption. Historians of adoption have re-
corded how, in the U.S. of the early 1900s, certain children were deemed
unadoptable due to bad heredity or “feeblemindedness,” that is, suspicion of mental
health problems and general lack of a “normal” profile. Many experts in adoption
policy worry that history will be re-created in contemporary concern over genetic
defects or mental health problems in adoptees. Such presumptions could work
against adoption and stigmatize adoptive families.
One major concomitant of genetic disadvantage and social stigma is deepened
inequalities. This is especially the case for children, whose major life-task is to grow
and develop capacities so as to function as productive adult citizens and workers.
One very helpful social justice framework for dealing with children can be found in
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Amartya Sen’s stress on development of capabilities or capacities as a pre-condition
to utilizing social opportunities. Sen and others argue that it is not sufficient to dis-
tribute goods and services equitably or to ensure formal equality of opportunity in
law. In Sen’s view we must ensure that persons receive what they need to develop
their capabilities to act in the economy and in the social-political sphere. Without
these enabling conditions, we are more likely to find powerlessness rather than
power; a series of failures rather than a series of steps culminating in full agency.
Social policies using genetic technologies need to be weighed against prinicples
of social justice and equal opportunity in order to see their impact on children’s
development. Growth proceeds by laying down one foundational building block,
which serves as the grounding for the next. For example, consider how private
healthcare insurability relates to employment. We can see a domino effect of one
action in childhood leading to diminished opportunity in successive life stages. So-
cial stigma often attends children without parents, including adopted and foster
children.7 Compounding this stigma, genetic testing information indicating a risk of
a certain disease may be entered on the medical chart of a young child. Later, the
child may be denied health insurance or given very high premiums. Since most
healthcare benefits are tied to employment, and most employers share healthcare
costs, employers are less likely to hire or promote one whom they see as a high-cost
worker. Genetic testing information that signals a “pre-existing condition” is still a
legally valid reason to raise health rates or to deny health insurance.
Hence, genetic testing in childhood, which may seem to be socially indicated at
one stage, may, at a later stage, diminish opportunities; for example, genetic testing
information may signal a red flag to employers when the child enters the job mar-
ket. Employability is tied to both healthcare access and housing so a child who ma-
tures into a high risk category in health insurability carries a distinct disadvantage.
That child does not face a level playing field in the effort to attain adult function-
ing.
Discrimination due to genetic conditions is prohibited by both federal and state
law. Genetic privacy legislation now passed in thirty states attempts to eliminate
these problems. In Massachusetts, for example, such legislation was passed in July
2000.8 But, the Massachusetts law does not cover life insurance. Its scope regarding
children, whose medical records follow them from cradle to grave, is not yet clear.9
The protections sanctioned in these laws depend strongly on individual patients’
rights to privacy and informed consent, but in the case of many foster children and
those awaiting adoption, these “gatekeeper” conditions are insecure at best and non-
existent at worst. A legal guardian (proxy or surrogate decision maker in place of
parents) makes medical decisions on behalf of children without permanent legal
parents. Sometimes the consent process is skipped entirely with these children.
U.S. Professional Societies’ Policy
Guidelines on Genetic Testing of Children
The predominant message of both genetic policy task forces and U.S. professional
genetic associations is one of caution on testing children. Exceptions are made for
cases where an effective medical treatment could be applied in the immediate period
of childhood. For example, a task force was commissioned by the Institute of Medi-
cine in conjunction with the National Institute for Human Genome Research, the
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government research entity which has now successfully mapped the human genetic
code. Because of the risk for social or psychological harm, this Committee recom-
mends that
in the clinical setting children generally be tested only for disorders for which a curative
or preventive treatment exists and should be instituted at that early stage. Childhood
screening is not appropriate for carrier status, untreatable childhood diseases, and late-
onset diseases that cannot be prevented or forestalled by early treatment.10
Should these criteria apply to children awaiting adoption? For example, should ge-
netic testing be expanded when social service agencies or prospective parents feel
they need information in order to make appropriate placement? Legal expert Lori
Andrews argues that no state requires a “duty to investigate” that would entail ge-
netic testing of children being placed for adoption. She gives a careful analysis of
legal precedent and state laws to support her conclusion. Ethical reasoning arguing
against expanded genetic testing for children awaiting adoption, in a “pre-adoptive”
stage, has been articulated by child welfare specialist Madelyn Freundlich.11 The
position argued herein agrees with their position and gives expanded reasoning on
the ethical and policy levels. Both Freundlich and Andrews consider the above posi-
tion consistent with an agency’s responsibility to divulge current information under
a statutory “duty to disclose” to prospective parents existing medical status, records,
and family history of any child awaiting adoption. In other words, adults consider-
ing the adoption of a child have a right to past and current medical information
about that child. Agencies responsible for the adoption have a duty to reveal existing
information. Yet these duties need not entail a pro-active duty to investigate, gather-
ing additional information, in ways that might potentially harm the interests of both
the child and the birth parents in terms of privacy rights or insurability issues.12
Leading U.S. medical professional societies concur with this general position.
The American Society for Human Genetics (ASHG) and the American College of
Medical Genetics (ACMG) have been an influential voice in the U.S., cautioning
against testing a child for genetic conditions unless an existing (not experimental)
medical treatment can be applied in the child’s minority. In 1991 and again in 2000,
they affirmed this standard for adoptive children, adding in 2000, that the standard
for biological and adoptive children should be the same.13 The ASHG/ACMG posi-
tion forestalls pressure from society or from prospective adopters’ request to test
children for non-medical reasons, for example, as a method of screening out unde-
sirable conditions to satisfy adoption matching requirements. If social service agen-
cies and adoption agencies were to test children before adoption on a wide scale, this
would involve expanding the domain of children’s testable conditions for a social,
not medical reason. It would expose a wider range of information about the child to
public view before any decision is made to adopt. But if the standard for biological
and adoptive children is the same, then the primary criterion for testing would be
some medical care applicable during childhood, not social purposes. Foster and
adoptive children would not be subject to greater testing just because they did not
have parents.
Differing views have been voiced. Some practicing physicians and pediatricians
in the United States argue that there must be very strong reasons not to comply with
parental requests for tests on children. They find it reasonable to defer to parent
wishes where the medical benefit may be marginal or where U.S. professional
guidelines are not definitive.14 In these cases, some physicians argue, there must be a
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very strong justification not to give the parents information on their child, that is, to
refuse to go ahead and test at the parents’ request. This dilemma raises the ethical
question: Is the pediatrician’s primary duty to the child? To parental decision-mak-
ers? What imperative takes priority when the child has no permanent parents and
stands in limbo between parents, awaiting adoption, or in foster care? Social service
professionals face similar quandaries: Which takes priority, the future interests of the
child or the interests of prospective adopters?
Gathering medical and family histories during the time a child is released for
adoption is of key importance in providing quality healthcare, both during child-
hood and later, when an adoptee reaches reproductive age and maturity. The prevail-
ing view among adoption experts, medical advisors, and social service agencies
stresses the importance of gathering full medical information for foster and adoptive
children including hereditary conditions in family histories. Those who observe that
all persons have some genetic susceptibilities argue that all citizens are therefore
potential targets of genetic discrimination, inferring that the risk of “genetic dis-
crimination” is falsely posed. In rebuttal, critics such as George Annas see dangers in
the social consequences of such discrimination regardless of the scientific status of
“genetic” or “non-genetic.”15
Medical Best Interest and
Healthcare Best Interest
A key distinction for genetic policy made by this author lies between a child’s medi-
cal best interest and healthcare best interest. A child’s medical best interest may be
defined as that set of medical procedures that maximizes the child’s welfare. The
main criteria for assessing medical best interest are scientific, diagnostic, and current
standards of care. What stands in a child’s medical best interest, though, may not be
available on the child’s current healthcare plan. Access depends on whether a child’s
parents or guardians have the money to provide that set of procedures. Therefore,
the medical best interest states an ideal, not necessarily an existing reality, in a par-
ticular patient or population.
Healthcare best interest may be defined as those actions that maximize a child’s
access to the best quality healthcare, in both the short- and long-term. Economic and
social factors, as well as long-term psychological consequences of genetic testing,
could undermine a child’s ability to obtain care. Therefore, access is key in
healthcare interest, whereas medical best interest is defined scientifically and does
not factor in social or economic access. Both medical best interest and healthcare
best interest should be factored into decision-making about children’s medical treat-
ment, especially considering when to undertake genetic testing. Ideally, medical and
healthcare best interests coincide, simultaneously enhancing the child’s access to
healthcare, as when a genetic test leads to an immediately beneficial medical treat-
ment, accessible to the child on her healthcare plan. Yet in some cases, the two inter-
ests may diverge. This is especially so for children whose long-term future is
clouded by poverty, substandard educational opportunities, and lack of permanent
parents. In these cases, for example, genetic testing information, even if it revealed
some medically meaningful data, might, by being recorded in the child’s permanent
medical chart, undermine the child’s insurability. Such testing would therefore un-
dermine the child’s healthcare best interest.
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The distinction between the child’s interest in medical treatment and the child’s
interest in healthcare access has not been made in the guidelines of medical profes-
sional societies. Nor has it received much attention in ethical or policy analysis. For
example, several guidelines permit genetic testing when an existing medical treat-
ment or prevention can be applied in childhood-onset conditions. Presumably they
refer to the relevant medical treatment apart from the question of whether or not the
child has access to it. Of course, it is always possible to raise monies through chari-
ties or advocacy in order to gain access for a given child. From a social policy per-
spective, though, such actions do not have system-wide impact and are not realistic
options for the vast majority of children in poverty whose parents cannot afford
healthcare, and especially for children awaiting adoption or residing in foster care.
These children, especially if they remain unadopted, lack the protection of perma-
nent legal parents, who remain the major providers of healthcare access.
At the general policy level, what may serve the child’s medical best interests may
not be available on the government-provided healthcare plan or on other plans. Ac-
tual healthcare delivery to foster children or those awaiting adoption in the “pre-
adoptive” stage may not be equivalent to the standard of care extant in the privately
insured healthcare system. A child’s permanent legal parents carrying private
healthcare insurance are more likely to have access to the best medical treatment,
whereas a child awaiting adoption or in foster care may not have access to state-of-
the-art monitoring technology such as CAT scans or MRIs.
So, having revealed a condition, genetic testing information recorded in the
child’s permanent medical record might actually end up undermining the child’s
ability to receive the healthcare to treat that very condition. Information-gathering
about something that merits treatment under the child’s medical best interest may
not enable increased healthcare access, but its direct opposite, diminished access.
This unfortunate paradox ought to be publicized to those who make policy and
health plans for children. Social service professionals in child placement, adoption
agencies in both the private and public sectors, and attorneys and legal professionals
arranging independent adoptions all need to be aware of the long-term social conse-
quences. Medical primary care givers, genetic specialists, and pediatricians need to
be informed.
In sum, policy evaluations often assume that what stands in a child’s medical best
interest also stands in their healthcare best interest, that is, securing access to
healthcare on a continuous, life-long basis. In a universal healthcare system without
deep inequalities, neither of these distinctions might assume great ethical or policy
importance. But because of the insecure basis of current U.S. healthcare delivery for
children and the numbers of uninsured children, it follows that genetic testing,
which ostensibly stands to benefit the child’s medical best interest, may not further,
but may actively undermine, the child’s current or long-term interest in healthcare
access.
Another distinction needs to be kept in mind. The term “adoptive child” used, for
example, in policy and professional societies’ guidelines, is ambiguous, referring to
(a) the “pre-adoptive” child in temporary or foster care awaiting adoption but lack-
ing permanent legal parents with the rights and responsibilities for that child’s medi-
cal care or (b) the child who has gone through a finalized adoption, including what
is termed the “post-placement” stage, in which the social worker monitors the child
and family for a healthy adjustment. Distinct ethical, policy, and social contexts
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apply in each stage, especially regarding the potential harms and benefits of genetic
testing. During the pre-adoptive stage, assignment of decision-making power, that is,
the person responsible for informed consent for medical procedures, including ge-
netic testing, may be socially and legally indeterminate. Under the post-adoptive
stage, the permanent legal parent has the right and responsibility to serve the child’s
best interest. Children in the pre-adoptive stage are especially vulnerable but both




The thesis presented here is that professionals in social services and medicine should
take a cautionary approach in genetic testing: Err on the side of caution concerning
genetic testing of foster and adoptive children, as well as children generally. There
should be a presumption against genetic testing while respecting the statutory re-
quirements of “duty to disclose” to prospective adoptive parents. In other words, one
can and ought to disclose the medical information gathered on an initial medical
exam to prospective parents and placement case workers. But this does not require,
from a legal or ethical viewpoint, an affirmative “duty to investigate” by gathering
genetic testing data that goes beyond the existing medical record. In other words, the
burden of proof should lie on proceeding with testing. Acceptable reason to test
should reveal information helpful to the child’s current medical needs for treatment.
Furthermore, any testing should meet the additional criterion advanced here: the
child’s healthcare interest. Any testing should support, not diminish, the child’s cur-
rent and future potential for healthcare access.
My basic position agrees with the standards in the guidelines of the major govern-
ment policy task forces and professional medical societies,16 affirmed for both bio-
logical and adoptive children, that no testing of children be done unless there is an
existing medical treatment for a disease manifesting in childhood. Genetic testing
for presymptomatic conditions (asymptomatic testing), carrier conditions (carrier
testing) or adult onset conditions (predictive testing) remains ethically unacceptable
for children. It is neither necessary nor helpful from a medical viewpoint. For ex-
ample, the following are situations where it is ethically unacceptable to administer
genetic tests: testing a child for Cystic Fibrosis when no symptoms are present, or
carrier testing for Cystic Fibrosis to see if the child will pass the condition to future
offspring, or testing for a condition which manifests in adulthood, such as
Huntington’s Disease. None of these provide diagnostic or treatment information
necessary from a medical viewpoint during the child’s minority.
Challenges to a Cautionary Approach
The first challenge to the above thesis argues for expanded genetic testing based
on the prospective parents’ right to know information about the child’s status before
permanent adoption. Some critics of the “consensus position,” as Dr. Lainie Ross
calls it, refer to the existing system of “matching” children and prospective parents
in state-sponsored child placement.17 As long as adoptive matching is a placement
procedure, she argues, genetic information should be gathered and disclosed to pro-
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spective adopters. Genetic testing information amplifies information needed for
matching appropriate children to appropriate parents.
Second, some critics argue for a principle of family autonomy, justifying parental
right over genetic testing of children. This position argues against medical or social
standards or regulation directed solely towards children. To emphasize a child’s
privacy or future autonomy interests over parental ones, it can be argued, weakens
the institution of the family. Under a principle of family, or parental, autonomy,
arguments can be given that genetic knowledge of a child’s future adult medical
conditions do strongly influence ethically justified parental care of children. For
example, on this view, it is ethically permissible for parents to use such information
in family planning or other decisions. Parents need such information in order to
anticipate, for example, educational or support resources that a child may need.
Third, while professional guidelines may agree on the ideal standards, we fre-
quently find gray areas. Even when medical and legal experts place high priority on
the child’s privacy interests, they may disagree about which cases ought to be sub-
sumed under those standards. For example, there is no curative treatment for
Duchenne Muscular Dystrophy, a degenerative condition that develops in childhood.
The most that medicine can offer is palliative or supportive care to ease symptoms.
Some experts would allow testing a very young child for Duchenne Muscular Dys-
trophy in order to inform prospective adoptive parents to be better prepared both
emotionally and financially to deal with the condition. Others would refuse it on the
grounds the child’s privacy interests are paramount and thus neither pre-adoptive
children nor biological children ought to be tested for it.18 Furthermore, genetic
policy experts have underscored the striking difference between public expectations
and actual scientific results. The Duchenne case illustrates a generalized phenom-
enon: The “therapeutic gap” between the number of testable genetic conditions and
ability to treat or cure them has not closed.
Fourth, some experts justify expanded genetic testing for pre-adoptive foster
children by appealing to the interests of special needs children in adoptive child
placement. These cases require a different framework from that of normal children.
They ought to work from the model of HIV+ status or substance abuse cases, where
agencies are required to disclose information on HIV or previous alcohol or drug
exposure to prospective adoptive parents. Given full information, prospective par-
ents can decide whether or not they can handle the financial and emotional chal-
lenges of such children. Disclosing such information will, in the view of some ex-
perts, facilitate responsible decision-making by parents on whether they can handle a
particular child and therefore reduce the rate of “disrupted” or “dissolved” adop-
tions, where the parents return the child to the state after discovering a condition
they cannot handle. Finally, providing more rather than less information to prospec-
tive adoptive parents can reduce the prospect of wrongful adoption suits.19
Current Status of Genetic Testing
How prevalent is genetic testing of foster and adoptive children? At the start of the
twenty-first century, some incidents of genetic testing of children in general and of
foster and pre-adoptive children in particular have come to the attention of profes-
sionals in social service and medicine. The number, however, is expected to rise,
since the production, marketing, and distribution of genetic tests has skyrocketed in
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the past two years. Tests are increasingly available to pediatricians and primary care
physicians, so their use may expand from testing for rare genetic disease to diagnos-
tic susceptibility testing for common diseases. Since genetic testing is also becoming
known to the public, prospective adopters may increasingly express a demand for
such testing.
For example, one independent adoption attorney recommended that a pregnant
woman, intending to release her future child for adoption, test the fetus for
Huntington’s Disease, an adult onset disease. In another case, an agency wanted to
give genetic tests to a boy in foster care whose family history included developmen-
tal delays, but who showed no problems. His case social worker protested, and the
boy was adopted. Later this case worker found the boy happily ensconced in his new
adopted family, at the top of his class in school.20
In one recent case a West Coast state social service department, in order to facili-
tate adoptive placement, considered testing two foster siblings for Cystic Fibrosis
(CF). Although they had a family history of CF, the children did not manifest symp-
toms of the disease, which appears soon after birth. The children did not now, nor
would they ever, have the disease, but they may have inherited the gene as carriers
to pass on to their heirs. In this case, social workers were persuaded by colleagues in
the state genetic department that there was no compelling medical need to test. Nor
were they required by law to investigate to uncover information other than that ex-
isting already in the children’s charts. The author found in interviews that increasing
numbers of prospective adopters consulted medical geneticists for a physical or ge-
netic testing examination that was done privately, independent of adoption agency
screening procedures. In some of these cases, the genetic information from the con-
sultation was not entered on the child’s permanent medical record, so it had little
impact on the child, positive or negative, other than affecting the immediate adop-
tion decision by those prospective parents.
Limits of the Law
The law does not offer definitive answers to the question of whether or not to ad-
minister genetic testing. Most professional policy guidelines recommend against
testing children unless there is an immediate medical treatment for a manifest child-
hood disease. These, however, are not legally binding. For example, if a social ser-
vice agency wanted to test a foster child for Cystic Fibrosis, even though there was
little chance of it manifesting in childhood, there would be little legal sanction
against such testing.
Even if the law gives no direct answers on testing questions, legal and economic
incentives to test or over-test may operate in the background, affecting the children’s
interests in indirect ways. “Wrongful adoption” suits, based on fraud and neglect,
have been successfully brought against adoption agencies that withheld medical
information on a child adopted by a parent who subsequently had difficulties in
raising the child. Specific cases have demonstrated that the agencies can be negligent
in disclosing medical information. But adoption agencies, fearful of capricious but
still costly legal suits brought by dissatisfied adoptive parents, may be overly cau-
tious about liability, and consequently tend toward testing children. Thus, social
results of liability pressures may bring over-testing, initiating a chain of social con-
sequences. Repeated testing may signal problems to healthcare insurers even if actual
test results indicate no difficulties. Tests may discourage prospective adopters.
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Brief History of U.S. Genetic
Testing and Screening Policy
Genetic testing and screening on children in the U.S. is of two types. Newborn in-
fants are subject to state-mandated screening in almost all of the fifty states. Experts
judge that the balance of benefits outweighs the risks, since revealed conditions,
such as PKU (phenylketonuria), allow immediate treatment to prevent harm. Special
diets and enzymes administered immediately to newborns can prevent mental retar-
dation. So the rationale for mandatory PKU screening presents a paradigm case,
giving an ethical and policy justification for mandatory genetic testing.
In older children, however, there is currently no federal or state policy requiring
genetic screening or testing of children. For this age group, governmental and pro-
fessional attitudes have been more cautious. Caution remains the policy position of
most professional organizations. As explained above, the American Society of Hu-
man Genetics (ASHG) and the Institute of Medicine note, for example, that “Be-
cause of this potential for psychological and financial harm, a growing number of
commentators and advisory bodies are recommending that genetic testing not be
undertaken on minor children unless there is an immediate medical benefit.”
It is important to keep in mind the balance of public interests and private rights in
current policy reasoning, especially as this applies to populations under state care. If
state interest in gathering personal private information is deemed compelling, as it is
in the military, which obtains a genetic profile of every member, then state agencies
acting in the public interest may override the individual right to privacy to gather
genetic information. A parallel reasoning for foster and pre-adoptive children might
emerge. The fact that the state has custody of them and functions as their guardian,
in place of legal biological parents, implies that the state has an obligation to man-
age this population for their best interest as well to maintain public health and
safety. Although social opinion recently quashed the prospect of genetic screening
for markers such as an extra Y chromosome, allegedly associated with criminal be-
havior, the technological possibility for such testing remains. It is possible that some
experts might recommend genetic testing or screening of foster care children in care
of the state, for example, to predict socially problematic costs or behavior. As ar-
gued below, however, environmental factors, such as reduced social and economic
opportunities for foster children, are primary factors in undermining equal rights
and opportunities. So the question of privacy rights for those under state care re-
mains an important consideration.
Race and ethnicity are especially controversial classifications which are bound to
affect foster and adoptive children. The fact that African-American children are
over-represented in foster care sounds a note of caution. Since genetic testing and
screening policies began, the issues of race and ethnicity have raised serious ques-
tions of stigma and discrimination. These have not had a favorable history in the
U.S. An example is the former discriminatory U.S. Air Force policy of not allowing
African-Americans carrying the Sickle Cell Anemia’s gene to pilot, under the mis-
taken impression that they might black out in flight. The policy mistakenly conflates
carrier status and the actual presence of disease. Government-sponsored mass screen-
ing for Sickle Cell Anemia in the 1970s was believed by some to have stigmatized
the black community and added a component of biological or genetic prejudice to
existing racial disparities.21 The screening was quickly stopped and has become an
infamous example of stigmatizing genetic policies.
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The statistically higher prevalence of Tay Sachs in the Jewish Ashkenazi commu-
nity, the prevalence of Sickle Cell Anemia in those of West African descent, of
Thalassemia in those of Eastern Mediterranean or Asian descent, of Cystic Fibrosis
in those of Northern European background, all raise the question of how to balance
appropriate diagnosis and treatment with the possibility of group stigma. To neglect
cultural attitudes that condition the delivery of healthcare is to underserve certain
populations, as Berkeley sociologist Troy Duster has observed in a special report on
ethnicity and genetic disease.22 The issue needs to be raised and addressed for foster
and adoptive children, especially since these are often children of distinct ethnicity,
whether from domestic or international origin.
Advantages of Genetic Testing for
Foster and Adoptive Children
Medical Best Interest of the Child
In some cases there is a dramatically effective medical treatment that needs to be
applied immediately to prevent harm to the child. Genetic testing reveals which
children will be helped. The classic instance illustrating medical best interests sup-
porting genetic testing is PKU, or phenylketonuria, which requires a special diet
avoiding proteins in order to prevent mental retardation. All newborns are screened
for PKU by state law in most of the fifty U.S. states. In some cases genetic testing
has predictive value with no immediate medical intervention. Dispute arises over
medical benefit in Duchenne Muscular Dystrophy, where, as noted, no cure exists
and only palliative care can be given. Other examples of medical benefit might be
found in testing for the P53 mutation associated with childhood cancers. If a family
history exists and genetic test reveals the mutation in a particular child, physicians
may monitor aggressively for tumors in the brain or lymph systems. But, the fact of
false negatives shows that genetic testing is not always completely reliable.
Child Placement
According to some social service professionals, a clear medical profile and family
history facilitates appropriate placement of children in permanent adoptive or foster
homes. The case for expanded genetic testing has been made by child welfare ex-
perts who point to the model of special needs children, children with disabilities or
specialized diseases which would severely burden prospective parents. Adoptive or
foster parents need to be fully informed of the heightened responsibilities incurred
by providing healthcare for these children.23
Prospective Adoptive Parental Interests and Informed Consent
Adoptive parents have a right to know as much about the child they adopt as they
possibly can. This principle can be argued from a general parental right to know,
from equity principles drawing on the analogy between prenatal and pre-adoptive
genetic testing, and finally, from a principle of parental responsibility. The best
interest of the child is effectively served by placement with parents who are in-
formed of conditions they are financially and emotionally prepared to handle. To
facilitate responsible parenting, full genetic information is required. It is also re-
quired to fulfill the conditions of informed consent by prospective adoptive or foster
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parents to take on the responsibility of a particular child. Parental right to know,
with as full as possible information, can be inferred from both responsibility and
informed consent.
Advances in Genetic Medicine
Genetic profiling may produce major advantages for children whose genetic profiles
have been carefully assembled. These benefits, discussed in detail below, include the
possibility of tailoring medications to those individuals. Genetic medicine will also
identify susceptibilities by genetic testing and then administer strategies to prevent
diseases from arising in the first place or to lessen the risks.
Disadvantages of Genetic Testing for
Foster and Adoptive Children
Currently, many policy experts, professionals in medicine, law, and bioethics, as
well as the general public, are cautious about the consequences of genetic testing for
the following reasons: The risk of genetic discrimination constitutes the first reason
of concern to healthcare experts, to the public, and to some advocacy groups.
Healthcare insurance can be lost entirely or premiums increased due to what insurers
deem a “pre-existing condition.” Loss of insurance in one case can mean loss of
insurability generally because private healthcare insurers share massive databases
covering national populations. Records are also accessed by employers who assess
costs of healthcare, since, as noted above, the majority cost of private healthcare
insurance is borne by employers. Legislation in thirty states currently prevents ge-
netic discrimination in health insurance and employment on the basis of genetic
testing data.
New privacy laws have devised heightened protections. But whether current legis-
lation will adequately enforce these protections is an open question. Medical records
are stored electronically and are easily available to many parties, a technological
reality that challenges the time-honored ethical principle of patient-physician confi-
dentiality. It is also unclear how protections will apply to children generally or to
children without legal parents, since much legislation assumes patients are adults.
Because of patients’ cradle-to-grave electronic medical records, information re-
corded in childhood—seemingly innocuous then—may have very different effects
during adulthood. Genetic testing information may constrain opportunities by under-
mining a person’s economic security and social status within families and within
communities.
From an ethical principle of avoiding unnecessary harm, the prospect of genetic
discrimination puts genetic testing of children in a cautionary light. The medical
ethical injunction “Do No Harm” signals a need to scrutinize social, psychological,
and economic effects of gathering genetic information. From the vantage point of
justice, under a principle of fair equality of opportunity, if genetic testing informa-
tion undermines equal future life opportunities for a child, then it is unjustified,
unless some immediate medical procedure serves the child’s interest.
Stigma, both within families and communities, is a form of prejudice or disre-
gard that goes beyond legal categories of discrimination. For example, children
within a family who test positive for a disease may be “preselected” for vulnerability
or negatively stigmatized by family members.24 On the other hand, if a family is
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strongly identified with and even politically active around a given familial disease,
and one sibling tests negative, a child may feel marginalized or like a “outlier” in
relation to family unity. Instances of survival guilt are also common in persons who
receive negative test results; for example, in families that have a history of breast
and ovarian cancer with the BRCA1 mutation. A women who tests negative must
rationalize her status in relation to an affected sister. So, a negative genetic test re-
sult does not necessarily guarantee human well-being or contentment.
Within communities, individuals who are known to be carriers are sometimes
stigmatized. For example, a retired army colonel who was known to carry a repro-
ductive genetic disease was forced to leave the town he lived in. The problem is
exacerbated in Sickle Cell Anemia, which could stigmatize the African-American
community, or Tay Sachs, the Jewish community.
Mental health conditions are especially vulnerable to stigma. This stigma may
increase with the prospect of genetic testing, but there is currently no genetic test,
for example, for a “schizophrenia gene.” No such single genetic alteration has been
identified. Scientists consider schizophrenia to be multi-factorial, not a mono-genic
disease. But, if scientists discover even mildly predictive genetic markers, then many
experts anticipate a large potential for stigma associated with such testing, for ex-
ample, in prospective parents who are particularly worried about mental health con-
ditions in children they adopt.25 In addition, genetic testing may be used in the fu-
ture to track children into educational niches, as in special needs or learning disabil-
ity classrooms. Adopted and foster children, historically subjected to eugenic scru-
tiny, may be considered eligible for such testing.26 Each of these types of stigma
could result in social tracking or an increase in the population of un-adoptable chil-
dren that some experts are worried might become one social consequence of genetic
testing.
Privacy Interests
Privacy interests apply to all children and also to those in the foster care or adoptive
process. They also apply to the birth parents and birth families of these children, and
to the prospective adoptive parents and eventual adoptive families. Although chil-
dren do not enjoy full legal rights, their interests should be protected during their
minority and for the future, to preserve their options in adulthood. Informational
privacy can be defined as others not having access to one’s personal information
without one’s consent, or the consent of a proxy, surrogate decision-maker. This
decision-making role, for a minor child, is usually served by the legal parent. But
such “gatekeeper” protections are difficult to assure for children in limbo between
birthparents and adoptive parents, or children in the foster system. Privacy interests
need to be connected with healthcare systems in realistic ways. In the ideal,
children’s privacy interests are explicitly defined and strongly asserted in the model
legal code, “The Genetic Privacy Act,” authored by Annas, Glantz, and Roche,
health law professors at Boston University.27
Informed Consent Based on the Child’s Best Interest
Each medical diagnostic or treatment procedure must receive the informed consent
of the patient. This principle, firmly embedded in U.S. law and ethical foundations
of medicine, is based on the autonomy of the individual. For children, an adult
proxy makes a surrogate decision based on the child’s best interest. The legal parents
have the prima facie right to be decision-maker for their children. As some clinical
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geneticists and pediatricians have observed, the decision-maker and the target to
whom genetic information is disclosed are both ambiguous in the case of foster and
pre-adoptive children. Is this decision-maker the state, the social service worker, or
the adoption agency?
Child’s “Open Future” and Future Autonomy Rights
A child’s future right to make a decision could be violated if testing for a non-essen-
tial medical purpose is conducted on the child; for example, carrier testing or testing
for an adult-onset condition that lacks any relevant treatment or prevention in child-
hood. Philosophers Joel Feinberg and William Ruddick have proposed that every
child ought to have an “open future” where the child’s options for opportunities or
to make decisions, under a principle of liberty or autonomy, are preserved as far as
possible.28 Testing to serve a current need has a permanent effect on the child’s fu-
ture: The information is placed in the child’s chart forever. Moreover, not all knowl-
edge of the future is beneficial, even if it predicts truly. Experience in genetic test-
ing for Huntington’s Disease, which arises in a person’s later life, has shown the
psychological ill effects of a “genetic prophecy” that can hang over a person’s life,
clouding hope and the enjoyment of living life in the present.29 I  effect, taking
action precludes options in the child’s open future and possibly robs the child of
autonomy to decide what risks and benefits to undertake. Of course, when immedi-
ate medical benefit exists, a surrogate ought to make a decision for the child based
on a reasonable assessment of what best preserves the child’s survival and health
interest.
Creation of a Pool of Un-Adoptable Children or a ‘Biologic Underclass’
One major worry lies in the possible social consequence of genetic testing, namely,
enlarging a pool of unadoptable children.30 This concern is expressed by child wel-
fare professionals, who already face the difficulties of placing foster children, as
well as by legal and policy experts. Historically, stigma has attached to adoptive
children. To many people, a child not a product of “one’s own” bloodline takes on a
secondary or suspect status.31 One source of adoptive children has been out of wed-
lock births which has historically brought the stigma of “illegitimacy.”
Suppose genetic testing of foster and adoptive children becomes widespread.
Then this whole population of children may come to be viewed as “in need of
screening.” Professional and public perception may regard these children as pre-
sumptively inferior, as happened at the height of the 1920s eugenics movement.
Even if all genetic test results are positive for a given child, the social presumption
against normality risks harm and diminished opportunity. Genetic tests create a hier-
archy of acceptable to undesirable children, which adds another layer of stigma.
Ironically, many of these children suffer only from the condition of needing parents.
Yet the rise of genetic testing and screening may function in public perception to
discourage prospective adopters. Finally, those whose genetic profiles reveal “prob-
lems” may revolve in foster care as a socially rejected class.
Trade-Offs on Genetic Testing of
Foster and Adoptive Children
The following dilemma arises in public policy, given rapidly advancing genetic
technologies. Either alternative — testing or failing to test — may bring harm to
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children in the future, so genetic testing itself may be a double-edged sword. On the
one hand, testing may put a child at social risk of genetic discrimination. On the
other hand, as genetic medicine advances into the field of pharmacogenomics, medi-
cal experts and pharmaceutical industry researchers predict that, within five to ten
years, genetic medicine will use genetic profiles to tailor medications to the indi-
vidual patient. Failing to test may put a child at a disadvantage in receiving particu-
larized healthcare treatments. Thus, when pharmacogenomics becomes the standard
of care, we may find that the failure to gather genetic profiles of foster and adoptive
children will prove to be a healthcare disadvantage.32
Also, future applications of genetic medicine will make advances beyond the nar-
row model of testing for monogenic disease associated with one gene marker. The
situation will become more complex. For example, if hormonal treatment for irregu-
lar menses is indicated, a teenage girl might benefit from knowing whether she car-
ries a BRCA1 marker for early onset breast or ovarian cancer, since hormones exac-
erbate the risk of breast cancer.33 Hence, as genetic profiles become part of routine
standard care, failure to test certain sub-populations could also disadvantage children.
Here we have a clear illustration of how the case of foster and adoptive children
serves to delineate public policy issues. Consider the following double bind: Because
of heightened risk to future equal opportunity (due to risk of discrimination and
stigma), it is in the child’s best interest to avoid genetic testing. However, because
technology is revising the medical standard of care and subsequent vulnerability to
unequal healthcare access, it is in the foster and adoptive child’s best interest to gain
genetic information. Thus, equally with others, they can benefit from genetic medi-
cine early in their life. However, each point of this bind is also fraught with difficul-
ties. The gatekeepers who give informed consent, who weigh the risks of harms and
benefits, are often not clearly identified or may be absent. On the other side, ques-
tionable access to healthcare for foster and adoptive children calls into question
whether expert genetic profiling and diagnostics will be applied. So, the bind is com-
pounded by the prospect of the child facing risks on each point.
Medical experts predict a new focus on children and even infants. Preventive treat-
ments delivered early in the human life-span may be more effective in changing the
developmental trajectory of the patient and consequently more advantageous in
avoiding chronic conditions or illness. Genetic profiles will reveal these susceptibili-
ties, the earlier the better, and the child will be preventively treated. The upshot is a
risk of deepened inequalities in healthcare under what promises to become a techno-
logically transformed standard of care. If healthcare delivery for foster and adoptive
children falls below the standard of care, due to lack of genetic testing profiles, then
we may see a divide between those who have permanent parents, with means, and
those who do not; those who have private and those with public health care. The
foster and adoptive group of children may then enter adulthood with comparative
healthcare disadvantages. Ultimately, the fact that either policy, testing or not testing,
might turn out to harm this group of children or subject them to unequal opportuni-
ties, points out the depth and complexity of possible trade-offs between healthcare
and social policy.
Conclusion
The best response to these complex dilemmas is continuous vigilance and scrutiny by
parents, agencies, legislators, and professionals who deal with child welfare. Current
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professional guidelines for testing children, such as the ASHG/ACMG guidelines
affirmed here, limit testing to conditions for which an immediate benefit exists in
childhood. All children will be protected, including foster and adoptive children, if
these are followed. In addition, a “healthcare access condition,” as proposed by this
paper, must be added to the calculation of the child’s best interests in each case. It is
not enough to test on the supposition that a medical procedure exists: A child must
be capable of realistic access to the medical procedure and that access not under-
mined by gathering genetic information. In addition, already adopted children
should enjoy the same medical and ethical standards for testing as do foster and pre-
adoptive children, so as to avoid a double standard.
Overall, public policy needs to examine the social consequences of applying new
medical and genetic technologies, especially regarding children, who may become
the prime patients in the future. Unequal access to social opportunities falls espe-
cially hard on children in U.S. society. The prospect of widespread genetic testing or
screening threatens to reinforce the cycles of poverty, adding layers of differential
access and unequal opportunity to existing patterns. For children, equal opportunity
in the present means permanency, stable family life, as well as parental protection
and access to healthcare. Equal opportunity in their future means entering adulthood
with equal prospects for employment, housing, healthcare, and economic security.
These challenges fall especially hard on pre-adoptive and foster children. That in-
creasing numbers of children stay in foster care is a profound national problem.
Many foster children exiting the system at eighteen, the age of majority, are thrust
out into society with little support and have trouble finding jobs and housing; a
pattern that reinforces cycles of poverty and unequal opportunities.
Some experts are worried about a “biologic underclass” arising in the genetic era
that adds unequal healthcare access and genetic stigma to already existing inequali-
ties. Children are located at the key developmental stage for grounding adult func-
tioning and equal opportunity through three factors: family, education, and
healthcare. Foster and pre-adoptive children comprise an especially vulnerable class
of children precisely because they lack legal parents and stable families to lay the
groundwork for these future options.
A cautionary tale to guide policy formation is offered here. As technology ad-
vances, genetic testing, diagnosis, and treatment will perform different roles. Not all
medical or social consequences can be predicted, so the normative standards dis-
cussed here will be re-evaluated as new procedures become the standard of care, for
example, in the predicted rise of pharmacogenomics. Under new paradigms of
healthcare, the lack of genetic testing profiles may leave certain groups of children
without equal healthcare. At each stage of this rapidly evloving technology, we need
to ask how the health and development of children without permanent parents will
be protected both in the short and long term. We need to ask what promotes equity
for their future life chances. We need to find ways to support these children in find-
ing stable, nurturing families. Their life prospects in society are lessons to society
and are instructive for us all.z
The McCormack Institute and the Center for Adoption Research co-sponsored a two-day
conference on the Ethics of Adoption organized by Professor Smith at the University of
Massachusetts Boston. One day was devoted to the Ethics of Genetic Testing for Foster and
Adoptive Children and other to Multi-Cultural Families in Adoption.
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